Badenu's History of Gen. Grant.

The Military History of Ulysses S. Grant. by ADAM BADEAU, Brevet Brigadier-General, and late Military Secretary, &c., published by P. Appleton & Co. in three volum es, the first issued in 1867 and the second and third just out, is an interesting production. It has doubtless been read and corrected line upon line by Gen. Grant; and, owing to the official relations in ileated above as existing between the writer and the hero, it will be received by the world as the authorized version of the hero's own story. Gen. Grant's well-known aversion to literary labor, no less than the active interest he is taking in political and business affairs, renders it highly improbable that he will ever imitate the example of Sherman, his favored lieutenant, and write his own memoirs. Neither the rank, public services, nor talents of the author of the present work entitle him to the consider ation which he may claim under these circumstances, and which the world will accord. We do not by this remark wish to imply that it should not, however, be esteemed on account of its own merit and value as a contribution to the history of the great robellion. It is written with entire independence of every one except Grant and those officers who have received the seal of his personal and political approbation. It is pold and free in personal criticism, as well as minute in the details of

military plans and operations. Gen. Badeau has displayed commendable dil igence and research in consulting and collating telegrams, reports, and other military documents, whether coming from the Confederate or national archives. He has quoted the exact language of many military despatches, and it must be confessed that this is done with great effect. No one, however duli, can read these pages without becoming filled with the idea that the actors in the war for the Union were worthy of their cause, and that the period which they ennobled by their deeds was one of the most heroic in the history of our country, if not of our race. The parrative has a wonderful swing and vigor in its description of campaigns and battles; and, so far as we have been able to test it by memory and such documents as are within reach, it is unexpectedly accurate in details, though at times unequal in the completeness of its descriptions volume, covering Grant's life up to his appointment as Lieutenant-General, and treating of the campaigns of Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, is by far the best of the three; and it is cu rious that while it refers to the period of Grant's greatest successes, it was also the one of which the author had the least personal knowledge.

We do not propose to follow the narrative

through all the incidents treated of, nor to point out or correct what we conceive to b misstatements of fact, or unjustifiable inferences. The frequency with which the author has claimed credit for Grant, and denied it to his subordinates, will cause his statements to be carefully tested, not only by the records, but by the memory of living participants in the events of which he treats. The war is happily at an end, and both Grant and his historian are private citizens with no more power to enforce their views against the truth of history than the humbles soldier who marched under the flag and kept step to the music of the Union. The author has not spared Thomas, nor Meade, nor Raw lins, nor Halleck, nor Canby, now, alas, removed from the field of their renown, and no longer able to defend their acts and motives; but their somrades and the records remain to defend them from any injustice which mars the pages of this history. Butler, Banks McClernand, Baldy Smith, Hancock, Warren Burnside, and a host of others, who are unsparingly condemned, may be de-pended upon to set forth the facts as they occurred; and so the Military History of Gen. Grant may do as much as a juster and abler work could have done in elucidating the truth, perhaps even more. We are particularly struck by the coincidence that the author has condemned, or given slight praise to, ever officer who incurred Grant's displeasure either during or since the war; and has shown grea ingenuity in several instances in making i appear that Grant also condemned them, and was entirely justified in so doing. This is especially noticeable in the case of Gen. Thomas, during Hood's campaign into Ten nessee, which we shall advert to further on. In no instance does Gen. Badeau admit that his chief ever misjudged a subordinate, misunderstood the facts, or made a mistake either in ac tion or judgment. Indeed, his work could not have been greatly different from what it is, if it had been written by a confessed hero worship per for the purpose of showing his hero to be the greatest captain of modern times, endowed with every virtue and free from every fault.

Throughout the extent of this work there is ot a word of criticism or re Grant's character, nor upon his method of conducting warfare; no admission that he ever committed an act of injustice, or that he ever received assistance in council from any of his subordinate officers, and, least of all, from any of those who were attached to his own personal staff. It is a fair inference from the text that the author claims for him all the credit of having conceived all the plans of all the campaigns conducted under his own immediate supervision, as well as of those conducted by other officers, after he became Lieutenant-General.

In order that the reader may form some idea as to the extent of Gen. Badeau's experience, and of his claim to special qualification as a military historian, it is not improper to call attention to the fact that he is himself in no sense a military man, but a private secretary from civil life, who gained all his knowledge of military affairs as a volunteer staff officer. He went into the field as the correspondent ne of the New York daily journals, in which capacity he wrote a number of letters from Port Royal. Shortly after his arrival at Port Royal, he voluntsered as an aide-decamp to Gen. Gilmore, with whom he served during the siege of Fort Pulaski, after which he bucame attached to the staff of Gen. T. W. Sherman as "additional aids-de-camp with the rank of Captain," and accompanied him to Tennessee, where Sherman served for a few weeks. When Gen, Sherman was sent to the Department of the Gulf he was accompanied by his nide-da-camp, who was wounded at the battle of Port Hudson, on account of which he retired from the field for nearly a year. He was then assigned to the staff of Gen. Grant, to whom he was recommended for the post of private accretary. He is ined the General after the battle of Missionary Ridge, and remained with him in a capacity rather civil than military

till the end of the war. He is an outhus lastic person, and not possessed of a specially critical or analytical mind. There is no indication in the volumes before us that ho is profoundly versed in the mintary art as laid down in the books, or that he is peculiarly qualified for military criticism or hingraphical writing; and this is, we believe, his only year ture in the field of history. We fail to find anywhere within the limits of his three volumes an admission that Gen. Grant was in any way aided by any one in his military is bors or in the evolution of the plans of his campaigns, or of the ideas which unde ley them; and we are especially struck by the imqualified assertion that Gen. Rawlins was in no way an assistant to Gen. Grant in the huther duties of chief of small. Indeed, the nuther discusses that distinguished officer's services, character, and reputation in a foot note on page 191, second volue and scarcely mentions him again, except on page 156 of the third volume. instance he speaks of him as "the nominal chief of staff of the General-in-Chief. who "gained all his military knowledge and experience as a staff officer taken from civil life, was," says Balcau, "a man of undoubted ability, of instinctive sympathy with popular feeling, whether in the army or out of it, and with productous energy in manner and language, He was passionately patriotic, and would have died for Grant. His intellect, however, was er tirely undisciplined, and his genius was quies rather than original or profound. He could a

ibly that bystanders often thought they were his own; but it would be a great mistake to magine that he was entitled to the credit of Grant's conceptions, some of the most successful of which he earnestly opposed. It did not take Grant and Rawlins to make Grant, as some have said who knew neither intimately. Rawlins himself would have been the first to repet the protonsion. He was simply an earnest, able man, who devoted himself absolutely to serving his country, and for him this was synonymous with serving Grant."

Now, those who are acquainted with the real relationship of Gen. Rawlins to Gen. Grant will be astounded at the presumption, no less than the injustice, of all this. The truth can do no wrong to Gen. Grant, but the contrary; and, notwithstanding the author's opinion. there are many who believed then, as they do now, that Gen. Grant and Gen. Rawlins were alike necessary to each other. Grant was professional soldier, of but limited scholarship, little experience in war, and no experience in civil affairs, when he became acquainted with Rawlins at Galena. It is no disgrace or discredit to him that he was at that time lacking in political convictions as much as he was lacking in experience; while Rawlins, an ardent Democrat, and supposed to partake of the sympathies of his party for the rebels, very greatly to the surprise of his friends and associates, immediately after the rebels fired upon Fort Sumter, became a no less ardent Unionist. At the age of 25 this remarkable man, the son of poor Irish parents, was engaged in burning chargoal for a living; he had not gone to school during his whole life for an aggregate period of six months, and was necessarily but poorly educated. It is true, however, that "he was a man of undoubted ability. of instinctive sympathy with popular feel ings, passionately patriotic, and having a natural genius for public affairs both civil and military." Gen. Badeau should have added that in these respects he was, in the estimation of those who knew him best, quite the equal of any man who made his mark during the civil war. His strength of mind was ex traordinary, his quickness of perception astonishing, and his force of will unsurpassed. He was virtuous and austers in the highest degree: his habits were simple and unaffected, his appetites and passions were perfectly under subjugation. He could become extraordinarily violent upon occasion, but it is also true that he never gave rein to anger except to denounce vice, insubordination, inefficiency. Our author tells us that he could seize the ideas of his chief and present them so completely that bystanders often thought them his own. We knew both of them well enough to venture the assertion that Gen Grant himself would admit that they were quite as frequently Rawlins's ideas as his own.

It is a part of the unwritten and hitherto un disputed history of our times that throughout the period of Grant's greatest performances, extending from the Donelson campaign to the end of the Chattaneoga campaign, Rawlins was his most constant companion and ablest adviser. Indeed, he was as much to Grant as Gneisenau to Blücher or Berthier to Bonaparte; for, although he was not an educated soldier, his was a positive, aggressive, and outspoken nature, acting upon one who possessed these qualities in a far less degree than himself. It was Rawlins who reproved the moral inadequacies of his superior, as well as pressed him forward vigorously on the path of duty and victory. It was Rawlins who reflected the best sentiments of the army as well as of the people, held at bay the sycophants and bummers who shamelessly attached themselves to Grant's staff, and so persistently followed his fortunes to the end. It was he who strengthened the good resolutions of his chief till they were victorious, and combated the bad ones till they were suppressed and abandoned. The author admits in the note just quoted that Rawlins was a man of instinctive sympa-

thy with the popular feeling, whether in the army or out of it, but he might more properly have stated that he was fearless in represening, at all times and on all occasions, to his chief the best sentiments of the people and the best ideas of the army. In this respect his conduct was altogether admirable. The weak, incompetent, and corrupt shunned him as they would have shunned the plague; the strong and zealous found in him their ablest and most fearless friend. It was Rawlins who persistently urged upon Gen. Grant the propriety of running the batteries at Vicksburg, although the idea did not originate with him, and of conducting a campaign eastward from some suitable point below to Jackson before turning against Vicksburg. It is true that Rawlins never claimed credit for these things, and that the records in most cases fall to show what course he recommended or what ideas he advanced. It is nevertheless known to many who are still living that Rawlins had views of his own on all juestions, and never feared to advocate them It was Rawlins who constantly besought Grant to give the enemy no rest, but to press him continually until driven from the field; but it was not Hawline who advised him to attack fortificaone in front, nor to use constantly the parallel order of battle. It was Rawlins who wished to fight it out on that line if it took all summer; but it was not Hawlins who proposed the useless assaults at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.

The second and last time that Rawlins is mentioned by the author is on pages 156 and 157 of volume 3, as follows:

"Rawlins, however, was intensely opposed to the proposed march of Sherman to the sea, so long as Hood was in the rear, and had combated it with every argument at his disposal. Grant as a rule allowed his staff to present their views on military matters freely, and some of them were accustomed to do so with great ability, but when ones his decisions were made they received them as final and did whatever was in their power to make them succeed, but in this instance the anxiety of llawins led him to an set of downright insuberdination. He started for the West bearing the order above quoted, and stooped a day at Washington. Hers he saw the President and the Secretary of War, and expressed so toroiby his apprehensions as to the result of allowing Sherman to move south and leave Thomas to contend with Hood, that he actually induced the Government to send a despatch to Grant desiring him to re-" Rawlins, however, was intensely opposed to

osend a despatch to Grant desiring him to re-onsider his decision." In this instance it will be observed that Rawins is condemned without argument and without effort to show that his judgment was at fault. We do not intend here to discuss th strategy of this campaign, but merely to point out that wiser military writers than Badeau have criticised it severely. The mereat tyro in military science could show the defects of the plan funder which Sherman, Grant, and Thomas were operating. It was a fortunate enough to demonstrate the incorrectness of hose plans by a terrible and overwhelming de feat. The columns of Hood and Johnson after the capture of Atlanta, moving on interior lines, simply lacked weight to reap the extraordinary advantage that was placed within their reach, Hood has been condemned almost universally for venturing to invade middle Tennessee, but his plan was correct & principle, and while it was to the highest degree hazardous, its very nudacity lifted it into the realm of great generalentp. Had his army been properly equipped and supplied, so that it could have mare! colerity, or had it found in its way a less skilful smmander than Thomas, it is not too much t assert that the responsibility for the march o the sea would have been sought for, with the object of affixing blame rather than of dispensing praise. Rawlins intuitively saw the langer, and when questioned by the President and Secretary of War, who recognized his great abilities, he loyally gave ther its opinion; and no man living is justified in aying that both weby misrepresented his chief niured his country, or violated the discipline sex, and himself, the only witnesses to what actually took place, are all dead, to charge him with "downright insuffordination" is certainly safe; but we doubt that even the Lieutenant-General himself, much less his military scoreald have dured to do so were he living to defend himself. In view of all this, we assert that no history which ignores Bawlins's

command, or to the country at large, can be regarded as just or truthful. Let him who doubts the importance of Rawlina's services, or is ignorant of the facts, appeal to Gen, Sherman, G. M. Dodge, Logan, Gresham, or even to Grant himself. The exact part taken by the "nominal chief of staff," as he is called

by our author, in each act of Gen. Grant's mili-

though he had decided views in reference to all

matters which concerned the army, he was too

ousy with his immediate duties, and too much

absorbed in the higher questions of military and

tary career, can never become known, for al-

civil policy continually thrust upon him by his position, to keep up a regular or systematic ecount of what he thought, heard, and saw. He is known, however, to have had the habit of writing to his wife and trusted friends in regard to whatever he regarded as important either in the history of the country or in that of conspicuous individuals. A number of such letters are known to be in existence, but it is supposed that after his death the most valuable of them were destroyed by those who should have kept them, while others were sold or given by his wife to a brilliant but somewhat unscrupulous officer, Col. Hillyer, who was also attached at one time to Grant's staff. But Hillyer and Mrs. Rawlins died shortly after Rawlins, and it is not known what became of their effects. The future historian will do well, however, to make a careful search for whatever was written by Gen. Rawlins, as well as by his principal assistant, Col. Theodore S. Bowers, who, it will be remembered, was killed by a railroad train at Garrison's just after the close of the war. These two officers held the most intimate and confidential relations with each other and with Grant. They followed him step by step through all the grades and all the triumphs of his career, serving him loyally, not because he was Grant, the successful General, nor because he was their friend, but because they were patriotic soldiers of the republic, loving the Union better than their lives, and believing that their chief was capable of leading our armies to victory. They were true representatives of that lovalty and devotion which animated both troops and officers; and each in his own way had a decided influence, not only upon Grant, but upon the events in which he took part. But they were not blind adorers who could see no defect in their chief. They knew his strength as well as his weakness, and never failed to applaud the one or to rebuke or point out the other. They were true friends, but they were more; they were brave soldiers and incorruptible patriots. Bowers was the son of a poor Lutheran missionary minister, who settled in southern Illinois in the rough days of its early history. He was diminutive in stature, modest and retiring in disposition, but honest, pure, unselfish, and brave to a degree never surpassed by the most favored sons of earth. He was self-educated in a country printing office, and the story of his patient. tollsome, and self-sacrifleing youth, his fidelity to his widowed mother and his older but less resolute brothers, his struggle for the support of the one and the education of the oth ers, his enlistment and service as a private soldier, his detail as clerk at Grant's headquarters, his disappearance from headquarters. and his reappearance in the ranks of his own company, armed with a musket nearly as large and heavy as himself, his gallant participation for three days and nights in the siege, assault, and capture of Doneison, and his quiet and unobtrusive return after the victory to his duties as clerk, his promotion on the field to Lieutenant for bravery, his persistent and unremitting toil as an Assistant Adjutant-General, rising step by step into the places made vacant by the promotion of Rawlins, and last, but not least, his beautiful and touching solicitude for his mother's comfort and happiness during his absence and the closing days of her life, all mark him as a true man if one ever lived. It cannot be said that he was a soldier by instinct, or that he originated any ideas as to military plans or policy, but he was more; he was a moral force, unspotted by the world, and proof against all temptation. The solicitude felt by that unselfish soul during the various crises in the life of Gen. Grant, when it seemed to be inextricably mixed up with the life of the nation, can never be known, since both he and Rawlins have passed away without giving it to the world. But to say that two such characters had no influence for good upon the General from whose side they were neve absent, is to faisify history, and to outrage the feelings of every man who knew their worth and appreciated their sterling qualities. No life of Grant is complete which fails to sider them as an honorable part of all he did or attained. To omit them entirely, as in the case of Bowers, or to misrepresent their character and services, as in the case of Rawlins. must be looked upon as injustice alike to them their modest claims to recognition. So, whatever may be the explanation of their treatment in this work, we must condemn it as an unpardonable defect in the author's plan, and say that he could have added no page to the mili tary history of Gen. Grant which would have done him more honor, or shone with greater brightness, than those which he should have

set apart for the story of these brave soldiers, faithful friends, and true patriots. We accord to Gen, Grant the fullest measure of praise for the extraordinary services he rendered the country during the rebellion. He was a great soldier from the beginning, honest and faithful in the discharge of his duties, brave and skillul in leading our armies, endowed with unusual pluck and common sense, and above all. he was extraordinarily fortunate in conducting campaigns and winning battles. In short, his military life was in every way creditable to him, as well as advantageous to the country, though not without faults, as Gen. Badeau would have the world believe. His pages unwittingly show that Grant was neither a great organizer nor a great tactician, and it cannot be denied that his plans of battle were frequently grade and imperfect, But it is worthy of note that during the period of his intimate association with Rawlins he made no great mistakes, and that as he fell away from Rawlins, which he did in a measure from the time he took command in Virginia, his career, though no less successful in the end. was far less brilliant from a purely professional point of view. This may be merely a coincidence, but if it is a coincidence it is a strange and suggestive one; and it was followed by another of the same sort, namely, that after the death of Bawlins, as Secretary of War, Grant continually committed civil and political blunders, and these have been repeated with increasing frequency down to the present time. When it is remembered that in the complex affairs of nodern life no man, however extraordinary his natural endowments, can be entirely independent of his fellow men, and that least of all can any General conduct a war like that against the slaveholders' rebellion without profiting by the knowledge and counsel of his staff, as well as by the general intelligence prevailing throughout the army, it will be admitted that Gen, Grant was no exception to the rule, and that this historian makes an unreasonable demand upon our credulity when he asks us to

believe that he was. After the issue of Sherman's Memoirs there was some discussion as to the origin of the plan of the Doneison campaign, and also as to that of the march to the sea, the conclusion of which was rather in Grant's favor than Halleck's or Sherman's. Badeau now shows that while Grant conceived a march to the Gulf, Sherman conceived the march to the Atlantic vaguely at first, but clearly and completely at last. This is an interesting and important cession, but it would be well to suspend judg-ment as to its accuracy till Gen. Boynton or some other painstaking investigator shall have consulted the record still further and published ail the documents bearing on the question, as has been done in reference to the circumafter the capture of Fort Donelson.

Our author assigns to Grant much, if not personal or official influence, doutes his masall, of the credit for the plan of the Chattaerly abilities, or belitties the value of his sernooga campaign, while he gives Sherman the ideas of his chief and present them so force i vices to Gen. Grant, to the armice under his a nearly all the praise for its execution; but |

much remains to be said respecting the share of Thomas and Baldy Smith in devising and carrying out that movement. The "History the Army of the Cumberland," the Rev. Thomas J. Van Horn, throws clearer light upon that period of the war than Badeau's book does, and should not be overlooked by the student who desires to obtain an accurate view of it. It is not necessary at this time to recall the extraordinary success which had crowned all Grant's efforts up to the end of the Chattanooga campaign. The campaigns of Donelson and Vicksburg reflect immense honor upon him and the army which made them, and had it not been for the disaster called by some the surprise of Shiloh (which, however, fell more heavily upon Sherman than upon Grant), there would have been nothing up to that to east a doubt upon the claim for Grant that he was one of the foremost military men of his day. We shall, however, leave the much debated question pertaining to the real nature of the battle of Shiloh to those who have a fancy for such wrangling, merely calling attention to the fact that much light has been thrown upon it by rebel reports, as well as by articles published by Union officers, since Ba-

deau's first volume was issued. That part of the second volume which refere to Grant's acceptance of the rank of Lieutenant-General, and his assumption of the actual command of the Army of the Potomac with the duty of fighting and defeating Lee, is very well written, and gives a truthful and dramatic ecount of the motives and considerations by which Grant must have been controlled on that occasion. The decision made by him and the courage with which he undertook the task which it imposed upon him, were deserving of all praise. Gen. Badeau has treated this part of his subject with ability, and if all his work had been as well done, or even as well as that giving the reasons which led Grant to pre fer the overland movement against Richmone rather than repeat McCiellan's unfortunate peninsular campaign, there would have been but little to criticise in his three volumes. Gen. Badeau treats the Wilderness cam-

paign as though the first day's march had

not been intended to carry the army beyond the Wilderness, If such was Grant's design, it was a great blunder, inasmuch as the Wilderness, being thoroughly known to Lee, could be used by him, as it was used, to mask his own attack upon the flank of the national columns. But while we must agree with our author that we were not surprised there, yet the fact remains that we were compelled to fight under great disadvantages when by a fair degree of celerity we might have cleared the region of tangled underbrush and reached the open field, where by superiority of numbers, if not by superior tactics, we could reasonably have hoped for a crushing victory. It is true, however, that the Army of the Potomac was, as yet, unacquainted with Grant, and lacked confidence in him, and that Grant was wise in acting with forbearance toward it; but we cannot suppress the conviction that he would have saved himself and it great trouble and much loss if he had insisted upon its making a forced march on the first day. The greatest defect of that army was a lack of promptitude and colerity and this is among the most fatal of military vices. It was quite within bounds that the first fighting might have been at Spottsylvania Court House instead of in the Wilderness, if the movement had been hastened as rapidly as the situation required. What the result would have been must always remain a matter of speculation, but the chances are in favor of Grant's having won a great victory. The fault was probably not altogether his, but a first-class commander with a genius for organization would have foreseen and prevented it. It was due more to the faulty organization of the army, and especially to the division of command and responsibility between Grant and Meade, than to all other causes put together. Our author admits the fact, but endeavors to show that Grant could not improve upon it, owing to the necessity of his directing at the same time the general operations of all the other Union armies. But this is begging the question, and it may be fairly said in reply that a first-class genius for war would have found a way to command the Army of the Potomac and at the same time to compel all the other armies to act simultaneously and harmoniously with it, The failure to do this was the fruitful source of incomplete success and bitter disappointment to the country. When Grant found himself finally compelled to ignore Meade and give his orders directly to the corps commanders, he took a most efficient stop toward bringing the war to an end. We do not mean to cast the slightest reflection upon the memory of Meade, nor to approve Badeau's strictures upon his conduct. and to Grant. Neither envy nor malice could He was an able soldier and a loyal subordinate; demand their sacrifice, for they had no enemies but no army was ever yet successfully and among their brothers in arms. The lustre of economically commanded by two Generals at Gen. Grant's name could not be dimmed by the same time. The fault of the arrangement was Grant's, because the power to change it was unreservedly in his hands.

> the 6th of May, when the night of Ewell turned the right of our army and overwhelmed the right division of the Sixth Corps. Gen. Badeau tells us that upon the receipt of this news Grant ordered reenforcements to the place of danger, and then threv himself upon his camp bed and slept soundly all night. This is hard to believe. The emergency was a very grave one, and if the rebel movement had been pressed after dark, there is but little doubt that our forces would have been disorganized and beuten. As it was, great confusion followed, and it was not till nearly midnight that order was restored, and not till dayvenied the fact that the Confederates had abandoned or failed to perceive the advantage they had gained the night before. Grant's importurbability had even then come to be looked upon as notable, but that he should have shown no emotion and slept soundly under such circumstances is not to be credited. On the contrary, there is reason to think that the fact was entirely different, and that Grant was deeply concerned by the news which first reached him upon that occasion. Col. Bowers, who was an evewitness of all that took place at headquarters, told us immediately afterward that Grant, after giving his orders, threw himself face downward upon his camp bed in a state of extreme emotion. This is not only a more natural story, but an easier one to understand, and much more honorable to him than sleeping soundly under such circumstances. His conduct the next day in ordering the army to move forward, and not backward, shows that he was neither demoralized nor beaten, and does him as much credit as the conduct of any other day of his life. It displayed not only fortitude, but ability, and from that day forward the army knew it must ultimately triumph over the enemy by mere "attrition" if not by great generalship, by "continuous nammering" if not by

The crisis of the campaign occurred on

grand tactics. The story of the campaign from the Rapidan o the Appomattex is full of exciting situations. and is in the main very well told. It would have been more useful, however, to the student if the topographical features of the theatru of war had been more fully described. The manouvring of the army, although much too deliberate upon more than one eccasion, was generally in the highest degree respectable, and especially so in withdrawing from the North Anna and crossing the Pamunky. We must, however, regard the detachment of Sheridan's savalry, and his raid against Richmond, as wrong use of that force, notwithstanding is victory over the rebel horse, and the death of Stuart at Yellow Tayern, Had Sheridan been required instead to throw himself on the flanks and rear of Lee in conjunction with the advance of the infantry, or at most to confine himself to breaking up the railroads upon which Lee depended for his supplies, and, in the foreible if not grammatica words of Sherman, "to break them up good," irant would have been enabled to shut Lee up in lighmond or Petersburg, if not to defeat him entirely much sooner than he did. Nor is

it out of place here to call attention to the

error in dividing his eavalry and sending Sheridan with one detachment to break up the roads north of Richmond, and Wilson with another to break up those bouth of Petersburg. This was a blunder, because both detachments were compelled to operate on eccentric lines, while the rebel cavalry was massed under Hampton, and was able to operate on interior lines. Sherldan's movement was a failure so far as concerned breaking up the roads. He fought a drawn battle at Trevillian's Station, and was compelled to make a wide detour to the north, east, and south to rejoin the army, being beaten at St. Mary's Church while covering the wagon trains which had been left at West Point. On the other hand, Wilson's column, although it was thrown straight out into the Confederacy, and was also roughly handled in returning to the army, accomplished all it was sent out for. It broke up the Danville and Southside Railroads as far down as the Stanton River so effectually that the rebels did not run a car over them into Petersburg for over two months. During this time they had to supply their army by wagon trains; and it is a striking and to us a disreputable fact that these trains were kept up between Lee's camps and Weldon, without serious interruption, till Petersburg was cap-It will now be generally admitted that Lee handled his cavalry much better inasmuch as he kept it together, and used it effectively first against Sheridan and next against Wilson; whereas, if Grant had massed his instead of dividing it, the ends of both expeditions would have been successfully accomplished, Hampton would have been beaten, and the rebel communications completely destroyed.

Gen. Badeau is very severe in his com ments upon Butler's failure to capture Richmond, and Baldy Smith's to capture Petersburg; and it must be confessed that he makes out a strong case against both of them, but we can leave them to settle the question with him. He blames Meade and Hancock for failing to properly supplement Smith's efforts to take Petersburg, and pronounces judgment against Warren, not only for tardiness at Five Forks, but for irresolution and censoriousness generally. With the exception of Meade, these officers are all living, and abundantly able to justify their conduct if they have been misjudged. The author has criticised them freely, and must expect that they will defend themselves not only against him, but against his principal, whom they will hold primarily responsible for any misstatement of facts or misrepresentation of motives in this narrative

Our author's gravest controversy, however,

will doubtless be with the friends of Gen.

Thomas. It will be remembered that when

Sherman "marched down to the sea," he left

Thomas to gather up the scattered detachments,

garrisons, dismounted cavalry, recruits, and

non-combatants of the Departments of the Ohio,

Tennessee, and Cumberland, and weld them

into an army with which to realst the march of

Hood's veterans into middle Tennessee, Gen. Badeau lauds the policy of this arrangement, while he condemns Thomas in unmeasured terms for slowness throughout the campaign. and especially for delaying to bring on the battle at Nashville. On the other hand, he praises Schoffeld for the victory at Franklin, in gaining which he had nothing to do, and says nothing whatever against his cuipable slowness in retiring from Columbia after Hood had crossed the Duck River and reached Spring Hill, fourteen miles in his rear. There is much room in all this for intelligent comment and criticism, but our historian does not improve it. He puts forth his best efforts in showing how slow Thomas was, and how great the danger was that Hood would cross the Cumberland River, and drive him back to the Ohio. He is silent, however, as to the fatal results which would have followed if Thomas had fought a battle ending in defeat. He ignores the difficulty of organizing an army out of the heterogeneous materials at hand, in the face of an advancing force led by such a General as Hood. He seems to forget that Hood's command was at least 50,000 strong, counting cavalry, and had been able not only to elude, but when it suited its purpose, to give battle to Sherman's magnificent army without suffering defeat; and that when this campaign began, Thomas bad less than 25,000 serviceable infantry, and 5,000 overworked and disorganized cavalry. It is true that Gen. A. J. Smith, a gailant veteran, with 10,000 more good infantry was on the way from Missouri to join Thomas, and that he had detached garrisons, dismounted cavalry, returning furlough men and quartermasters' employees sufficient to bring his force up to nearly 70,000 men; but these troops required first to be concentrated. next to be organized, and lastly to be armed. equipped, and mounted. This was done with extraordinary confdity and all the circumstances of the situation are duly considered. It doubtless seemed to Gen. Grant and the Administration at Washington that Thomas was acting with too much deliberation. and was running a great risk; but they should have remembered that he was a veteran General of unblemished reputation. the hero of Mill Spring, Perryville, Murfreesboro, and Chickamauga, and the peer of any commander in the Union service. They should have left him free to take his own measures and fight at his own discretion, instead of treating him as though he were a schoolboy unable to manage a campaign or deliver a battle. No competent critic can read this Military History of Gen. Grant, and fairly consider these facts without coming to the conclusion that his interference with Thomas during the Nashville campaign was not only wrong, as admitted by Grant in his official report, but was false in principle and pesnicious in tendency. Had Thomas given battle when or dered positively to do so without further delay, his army must have been driven back, if not disgracefully defeated, for at that time the entire country was so covered with ice and the ground was frozen so hard that neither men nor horses could have gone into action against a strongly intrenched enemy, with the slightest hope of success. Thomas's conduct at this juncture was in the highest de-gree leval and praiseworthy. He cheeroffered to surrender mand to whomsoever might be designated to succeed him, but he would not consent to attack against his judgment. In this he was unanimously supported by his corps commanders, the youngest speaking first (as is customary in military courts and councils), and not the oldest, as Gen. Schoffeld alleges in a letter recently published. Our author specially inveighs against Thomas for waiting for Wilson to remount his cavalry, admitting that a large and well-equipped body of mounted troops might be regarded as a good thing, but claiming that in this instance they were unnecessary, and the horses a positive weakness, In view of the fact that it is now a acttled principle in the art of war that the cavalryman's horse is merely a means of transporting him rapidly and saving him from

fatigue, so that he may attack the enemy on the

with which he has touched upon subjects

for controversy, especially as to personal

modern

flank or rear, or operate effectively upon his communications; and in view of the fact that at the battle of Nashville and during the campaign which followed, this service was quite as effectively performed as in any battle or campaign of times, Gen. Badeau's conclusions fall to the ground, and the course of Gen. Thomas must be fully approved. It would have been more creditable to Badeau if he had frankly admitted. as did his hero, for he was truly a hero in that instance, that the result justified Thomas fully, showing that he was right and Grant wrong. This will doubtless be the verdict of history as well as of all competent critics. We have before remarked that Gen. Badeau's writing is not equal or uniform in quality. This is particularly the case in the account of the battle of Winchester, and in the descriptions of all the closing campaigns of the war except that ending at Appemattox Court House. Ho is to be congratulated, however, on the skill

to have his hands full in maintaining his opinions, as well as in showing that he has neither suppressed the truth nor perverted the facts. No matter what may have been the merits of this General or that, most of them, it will be admitted, have shown themselves ready with the pen, and quick to defend their motives as well as their conduct. Whatever may be the outcome of these controversies, the "Military History of Gen. Grant" must remain highly honorable to him. It shows that dur-ing the whole of the civil war he was loyal to every trust, faithful to every duty, successful in every task, and altogether a virtuous and meritorious as well as a fortunate defender of his country's unity. In view of all this, it should be a matter of little moment to him or his countrymen whether he takes rank as a General with Hannibal and Casar or only with Mariborough and Wellington. It is to be deeply regretted, for the sake of the country no less than for that of Gen. Grant, that his civil history, when it shall come to be written, cannot possibly redound to his glory like that which we have now reviewed.

Brugsch's Egypt.

The most extensive and important contribution to our knowledge of the early history of the Nile land that has yet been given to the world is presented in the new edition of Egypt inder the Pharaolis, by Dr. HENRY BRUGSCH BEY, 2 vols. (London, John Murray.) With the possible exception of Mariette-Bey, no contemporary scholar has done so much for the deciphering of Egyptian monuments, and it is the distinguishing peculiarity of this narrative that it is exclusively based upon hieroglyphical inscriptions. The author's resolution to confine himself in the present work to Egyptian sources, has led him to bring his history to a close with the death of Psammetichus. In a supplementary chapter one of the English editors, Dr. Smith, traces rapidly the course of events, from the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses, to the necession of the Prolemid dynasty. The history of the Ptolemies is to form the second division of Dr. Brugsch's large design.

In a good many particulars the conclusions of Dr. Brugsch will be found to differ materially from those of other Egyptologists. He rejects for example, the idea, which, however, has found much favor, of a Pelasgo-Italian Confederacy of nations in the times of Mineptah II. and Ramses III (1300-1200 B. C.). He also regards Illium and the Dardanians, Mysians and Lyslans as powers unknown to the Egyptians of the fourteenth century, and places the peoples of corresponding names in the highlands about the upper course of the Euphrates. Here, it will be observed, the author declines to sauction the view taken by Prof. Ebers in that one of his interesting novels, "Uarda," which deals with the reign of Ramses II. Dr. Brugsch believes that he has further established the remarkable fact that the Egyptian monuments of the date of 1000 B. C. and later, attest the presence of Assyrian Satraps in the Nile valley. His conception of the route taken by the Hebrews in their exodus from Goshen, will of course be examined with special interest. We may note in passing that the essential feature of his theory loes not, as has sometimes been alleged, consist in localizing the great catastrophe which overtook Pharaoh's army at the tongue of land between Lake Sirbonis and the Mediterranean. but in identifying the general direction of the route, which would lead us, not to the Red Sea, but to some place yet undetermined on the Mediterranean coast in the region of lakes and

marshes about the Pelusiae mouth of the Nile. A preliminary word should also be said about the chronological part of this work. In Dr. Brugsch's opinion very much remains to be done in this province, so far as relates to the times preceding the twenty-sixth dynasty (666 B. C.). We might, indeed, accept with confidence the dates assigned by Lepsius to the ancient Egyp tian Kings, if we could admit the trustworthiness of Manetho's lists, on which the chronology framed by Lepsius was based. But the nonuments are beginning more and more to discredit the numbers of Manetho; they indicate that his lists included contemporary and collateral dynasties, and would thus tend to diminish considerably the total duration of the thirty dynasties enumerated by the Egyptian priest. Dr. Brugsch has, accordingly, constructed a provisional chronology, with the help of materials furnished by inscriptions. among which may be mentioned the new table of Abydus, and a pedigree of twenty-four court architects. The truth is that instend of growing less, the in determining the chronological relations of Egyptian history seem to be multiplied from day to day, for new problems are continually presenting themselves in this fleid of inquiry. For instance, the question is now raised whether the old inhabitants of the Nile valley used the same form of calendar at of these considerations, the author presents his scheme of chronology with extreme difficience and in the hope of indicating rather the true position of persons and events in the order of sequence, than their precise dates in order of time. He does not think that the first dynasty should be pinced earlier than 4400 B. C., which is more than 1,200 years later than the date assigned by Unger, and about 800 years earlier than that suggested by Bunsen. The third (or first Memphis) dynasty began reign, in his opinion, about 3906 B. the twelfth (or first of Thebes) in 2466 B. C. The Egyptian Alexander, Thotmes III., of the eighteenth dynasty, would, under this scheme, be referred to 1600 B. C., and the next greatest conqueror. Ramses II. of the nineteenth dynasty, to 1333 B, C. The son of this Ramses Mineptah II., the author identifies with the

Pharaoh of the exodus. Whence came the original inhabitants of the Nile land, and what were their ethnic afflitations? It may be positively affirmed that the forefathers of the Egyptians cannot be reckoned among the African races properly so called. The form of the skull as well a proportions of the several parts of the body have been held to indicate a connection with the Caucasian family of mankind. It would seem that the Egyptians form a third branch, designated as Cushite, and distinguished by special characters from the Arran and Semitic varieties of the Caucasian type. Dr. Brugeen has no doubt that the cradle of the Egyptian people must be looked for, not in Ethiopia, but in the interior of the Asiatic quarter of the world. It is not, as a Greek legend averred, to a colony of Ethiopian priests that the Egyptian empire owed its origin, its form of government, and the characteristic features of its high civilization. Much rather was it the Egyptians that ascended the river to found in Ethiopia temples, cities, and fortifled places, and to diffuse the refinements of a civilized state among the rude, dark-colored population. Whichever of the Greek historians concected the flation of the primitive Ethiopic settlement in Egpyt, was probably led into the blunder by confounding the state of things in the pre-historic age with the retroactive influence which Ethiopia once civilized, came to exercise on the fortunes

of Egypt at a comparatively late period. The distinctive name of the Exyptian people the inscriptions is "the people of the black land," the term, of course, referring to the peculiar color of the soil in the Nile valley. The names of Mizzeim, Muzur, and Misr, applied to Egypt by the Hobrows, Assyrians and Arabe, are all apparently derived from the Egyptian word mazor (fortified), a name give: to a part of the Egyptian frontier in the cast of the Delia, which was covered and defended by many zor or fortresses. We need not say that ancient Expit (frequently mentioned in the inscriptions as the double land) consisted of two great divisions, which, from their situation, the tengers, from who it we infor that he placed were called respectively the land of the south and the land of the north. Southern or Upper Egypt extended from the ivory-island city of Elephantine to the neighborhood of the Mem- ascribed the foundation of the splendid capital phian district. Northern Egypt comprehended of the old empire. Memphis, after he had dithe remaining part of the valley called the low country, the Delta of the Greek writers. Prof. Brugsch points out that this division is not accidental or arbitrary or bus become convinced by personal examination merely geographical, being founded on a and measurements made on the spot that the

spective dialects of the inhabitants. As early as the thirteenth century before our era this diference of speech is proved by documentary-evi-Each of these large sub-divisions was divided into districts or nomes, there being at one epoch twenty-two of these in upper and twenty in lower Egypt, Each district had its own capital, which was the seat of the Governor for the time being, whose office and dignity passed by inheritance from the father to the eldest grandson on the mother's side. The district capital formed likewise the central point of the particular divine worship of the nome which belonged to it. Egyptian monuments enable us to form a tolerably exact picture of the nomes in all their details, and furnish abundant ground for believing that each district constituted a little nation with its specific religion, laws, and customs, and enjoying a large measure of self-government. The empire of the Pharaoha was therefore an imperial confederation, held together firmly enough in the hands of a strong ruler, but in which the process of amalgamation was never completed. It happened not infrequently that the bostile feelings of different nomes broke out into a violent struggle, which it required the whole power of the King to extinguish. Such feuds indeed sometimes affected the whole dynasty, the reigning family having to give up the grown to the victorious prince of an insurgent nome. There were, however, three districts which, through the course of Egyptian history, maintained the reputation of being oftenest the sents of government for the whole country, viz., in lower Egypt the nomes of Memphis and Heliopolis, and in upper Egypt that of Thebes.

To what extent do the monuments throw

light on the distinctive mental endowments and moral qualities of the ancient Egyptians? Dr. Brugsch does not at all concur with those historical inquirers who are disposed to regard the Egyptians as a reflective, serious, and reserved people, occupied only with the other world, and caring nothing, or very little, about this earthly life. He thinks that those who travel through the land of the old Pharaohs, who read the words cut in stone, or written with black ink on the fragile papyrus, and serutinize the pictures carved or painted on the wails of the sepuichral chapels, will be constrained to form a widely different judgment. No people could be gayer," he declares," more ively, of more childlike simplicity than were those old Egyptians, who loved life with all their heart, and found the deepest joy in their very existence." It is true that they believed in the immortality of the soul, but far from longing for death, they addressed to the host of the holy gods the prayer to preserve and lengthen life, if possible, to the "most perfect old age of 110 years." No doubt toll was the condition of existence for the masses in Egypt, as in every ommunity, but in their intervals of leisure they gave themselves up to the pleasures of a merry life-to the song and dance and flowing cup, cheerful excursions to the meadows and the papyrus marshes, to hunt with bow and arrow or sling, or to fish with spear and hook." A blithesome disposition was attested by the national proclivity to humorous jests and sallies of wit, often passing the bounds of decorum. That the ancient Egyptians were exceptionally fond of smart innuendoes and biting libes is demonstrated by the fact that the freest social talk found its way even into the sacred chambers of the tomb. The lowest classes of the people-the mob, as

the instriptions call them-were occupied with

husbandry, the breeding of cattle, fishing, and the different branches of industry. From a very early period stone was wrought according to the rules of an advanced skill; and metals gold, silver, copper, iron, were melted and wrought into tools and implements or works of art. Glass was made, wood and leather were formed into a great variety of valuable objects; flax was spun, and woven into linen stuffs; ropes were twisted, baskets and mats of rushes were plaited, and on the potter's wheel great and small vessels were formed by clever artists from the rich clay of the Nile, and baked in the furnace. Scuiptors and painters found profitable work among the wealthy patrons of art at the court of the Pharaolis. But all these followers of industry and the earliest human art were held in bad odor, and the lowest scribe in the service of a great man looked down with contempt on the toiling multitude. Though themselves children of the people, the class of servants found protection from their masters and had a share in the luxury of the court. The class of nobles in Egypt had little in common with the vulgar mob. It was formed, on the one hand, of descendants from the royal dynasties, and on the other of persons ennobled for distinguished services in civil and in military employments. It should be noted that the restraints of casts did not operate as an insuperable bar to individual aspirations; that obscure descent did not block the rising career all ages of their historical existence. In view of the intelligent. It was owing to this fact that tion formed spirit of the old dwellers on the Nile. Husbandman competed with husbandman, artisan with artisan, official with official, to outvie his feilow and appropriate the praises and favor of the lords. In the schools where the poor scribe's child saton a bench beside the offspring of the rich, the masters never failed to remind ilm by apt instance and anecdote that the elever son of the humblest might hope by his knowledge and abilities to climb the ladder of the higher offices. Many a monument consecrated to the memory of some deceased nobleian, who during life had held high rank at the court of Pharoah, is decorated with the signifiant inscription. " His ancestors were unknown people." Dr. Brugsen, indeed, makes it plain that the training and instruction of the young interested the Egyptians in the nighest degree. They fully recognized in education the sole means of clevating their national life, and of fullilling the civilizing mission which, as they believed, the delty had placed in their hands. Above all things, they regarded justice, and virtue had in their eyes the highest value, The law which ordered them "to pray to the gods, to honor the dead give bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothing to the naked ! reveals one of the fine qualities of the old Expetian character, pity toward the unfortunate. Dr. Brugsen considers the forty-two commandments of the Egyptian religion, which contained in the 125th enapter of the Book of the Dead, as in no way interior to the precepts of Christianity. In reading, indeed, the old Egyptian inscriptions concerning morality and the lear of God, the student is tempted to elieve that the Jewish lawgiver, Moses, modelled his teachings on the patterns given by the

education and made him familiar. The monuments have thus far thrown little light on the histories of the first three dynasties which, according to Brugesh, cover the period between 4400 and 37 to b. C. The founder of the first dynasty, Mona, with whom the union of upper and lover ligypt, under a single head began, seems to have been at first the ruler of Tinh, a could town west of the Nile, whose name the Greeks converted into This or Things. It was too ancient metropolis of the strictly name of upper Egypt, and lay close to what was afterward the great city of Abydus, Heen under the sovereigns of the nineteenth deposite the highest servants of the state of mand's own race were designated by the sof " filog's Sen of Tinh," a fact explicable the tradition that this town had been the cradle of the first Egyptian monarch. Mena is said to have been the first inwaiver of Egypt, by which, of course, we understand that his was the engliest attempt to impose laws of national or importal scope. According to other accounts he was the first to set in order the worship of the gods and the hoty ritual of mutual respect, and perhaps invested certain deities with a national dignity. To him also is veried the stream of the river by an enormous dyke. In order to gain a wide epace for building the new city. It is netoworthy that Linant-Bey marked distinction of habits, manners, and existing embankment, known as the great bank fact that Grant afterward committed another | characteristics and impulses. He may expect | customs, and on a decided difference in the re- | of Cocheche, is, in all probability, the same which

id Expetian sages, and with which his own